

RESPONSE TO INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT



Submitted to the Virginia Beach City Council

March 3, 2020

Tom Leahy, Acting City Manager

Table of Contents

Preface	2
Executive Summary	3
Human Resources Recommendations	8
Public Safety Recommendations	14
Facilities Recommendations	18
Detailed Responses – Human Resources	22
Detailed Responses – Public Safety	35
Detailed Responses – Facilities Security	46
Detailed Budget	54

Preface

May 31, 2019 will forever be remembered as the darkest day in the history of the City of Virginia Beach. On this day, a City employee killed 12 people and shot five other employees, including a police officer, before he was taken into custody after an exchange of gunfire with police. The wounded shooter was transported to the hospital where he later died.

Our recovery includes honoring the innocent victims and remembering the contributions they made to our wonderful city. We are equally committed to caring for those who were injured, family members of the victims and others impacted by the horrific tragedy. This process will take time. Recovery is measured in years, not months.

No one is more committed or determined to understand the circumstances surrounding the events of that day than is our City organization. From the City Council and staff leadership to the employees in Building 2 and detectives who have worked tirelessly to gather, review and evaluate every potential piece of evidence, enormous resources have been devoted to concluding whether it could have been prevented and how best to rectify any potential gaps in security going forward.

It is to this end that the City Council resolved to commission an independent review of the City's actions in response to this event. This report reviews the 58 recommendations identified by the consultant, Hillard Heintze, for relevance and applicability to the City of Virginia Beach.

We do know that the City of Virginia Beach employees and citizens inside Building 2 as well as responding police officers, sheriff's deputies, fire and EMS personnel, 911 operators and bystanders acted courageously in the face of extreme danger. The entire City workforce and the community quickly mobilized to respond as the incident was unfolding.

Public safety personnel were prepared, trained and equipped to respond to this event. The collective response by employees and the community was exceptional. However, we continue to struggle with the fact that no clear motive for this horrible event has emerged. The attacker did not demonstrate any warning signs or behaviors that would have merited an intervention ahead of the incident that occurred on May 31, 2019. These facts coupled with the unfettered access the shooter had within a building that was very compartmentalized, made it difficult to mitigate.

There are parts of the independent review with which we agree and there are some that we do not. In the end, it is about learning from and improving upon what we did as an organization as we responded to and are recovering from this event. The City of Virginia Beach is a learning organization. We will identify and correct any gaps identified and we will share our lessons learned with those coming behind us, just as Sandy Hook, Orlando, San Bernardino, Las Vegas, and too many other places to name have done before us. All of this to make our world a safer place to live, work and play.

Executive Summary

In the aftermath of the May 31, 2019 tragedy, the Virginia Beach Police Department (VBPD) immediately initiated a comprehensive criminal investigation. Detectives anticipate completing their report this fall (2020). The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is not conducting an independent investigation of the event. However, VBPD requested and is receiving assistance from the agency with evidence recovery and crime scene investigation in Municipal Center Building 2, victim/witness interviews, forensic analysis of the shooter's work computer and behavioral analysis.

The VBPD provided a briefing of preliminary investigatory findings to the City Council on September 24, 2019. In that briefing, VBPD reported they had found no evidence that foreshadowed a motive or any other signs of what the shooter would do that day. Neither his co-workers nor people in his supervisory chain had any reason to suspect what was to come.

The VBPD has completed more than 1,000 interviews and is compiling that information along with a summary of the three terabytes of data, which includes an exhaustive review of e-mail and other digital material. The evidence has not indicated any new revelations, suggested any data gaps, or uncovered after-the-fact deletions of emails¹.

The Virginia Beach City Council directed the city auditor to engage an independent consultant to conduct a review of the tragedy by formal resolution adopted on July 2, 2019. The review was to include:

- A timeline of the event
- The attacker's employment history and workplace interactions
- A review of City policies, procedures, and practices (including facility security, workplace violence, and employee alerting and response to active shooter notifications)

A major objective outlined in the resolution was to ensure the review would be completely independent of the ongoing criminal investigation and not influenced by any City staff, including the auditor. The consultant was to have unrestricted access to all employees, reports, documents and other records necessary to complete its independent review.

The City received 15 proposals in response to a request for proposals and Hillard Heintze, a security risk management firm, was selected for the independent review. Hillard Heintze initiated its review on July 22, 2019 and presented its report and findings to City Council on

¹ City e-mails exist in the Microsoft Cloud – not in the City's data center. IT does not have physical access or administrative rights to the email servers, and cannot access the individual files in a way to alter the content, or delete files without creating a permanent record. The emails were recovered by a City IT InfoSec specialist who is a certified forensic analyst. The files were reviewed by several VBPD specialists who have expertise and certifications in digital downloads. In the course of its investigation, VBPD read e-mails back to at least 2017 and no chronological gaps were identified.

November 13, 2019. The scope of its review (pages 15-16 of the report) was wide-ranging, as summarized below:

- *A continuous on-site presence in Virginia Beach conducting interviews and collecting and reviewing observations and evidence from the initiation of the project to its completion*
- *More than 230 interviews with witnesses, City employees, family members of the victims, and responding officers and supervisors on the scene*
- *Interviews with key individuals in Human Resources, the VBPD, the City Auditor's Office, the Magistrate's Office, the Virginia Beach Fire Department (VBFD), the Office of Emergency Management (OEM), Virginia Beach Emergency Medical Services (EMS) and the Facilities Management Office*
- *Review and analysis of policies, crime reports, evidence, data and electronic records, including 335,000 emails and 6,500 documents*
- *Refinement of the timeline of the attack*
- *A retrospective threat assessment*
- *Direct engagement with stakeholders through interviews, group discussions and public forums including Employee and Community Listening Sessions and provision of direct lines of access such as a public-facing e-mail address and a toll-free phone number*
- *A survey of the entire workforce, and one specifically for employees in Building 2*
- *A physical assessment of Building 2 and the municipal campus*
- *Searches of social media and public records relating to the attacker and possible motives*

During the November 13, 2019 briefing Hillard Heintze representatives indicated that they had received complete and transparent cooperation from the City. They also indicated that they did not see evidence to support allegations that some e-mails had been deleted². As directed by City Council, the report was independently prepared by Hillard Heintze. Because there was no draft review by City staff, there are some points that require clarification and correction, but nothing that would alter the report's findings (pages 64-65) that this attack could not have been anticipated or prevented.

Hillard Heintze provided six key findings (beginning on page 17). Key Findings #1 and #2 address the public safety response, the attacker, and the whether the City could have anticipated the tragedy. These two findings are excerpted below:

² However, they also indicated that they could not speak to any City actions prior to being provided the e-mail records. As indicated in Footnote 1, City e-mail resides in the Microsoft Cloud and the City does not have the ability to alter e-mail content, or delete files without creating a permanent record.

Key Finding #1, Page 17: *The City of Virginia Beach employees, police and first responders acted courageously in the face of life-threatening danger, and their actions prevented further casualties.*

- *City personnel acted heroically. Many Building 2 employees placed themselves in peril to save their coworkers and prevent further loss of life. The VBPD's response was swift and effective. Officers entering Building 2 followed best practices, demonstrated highly disciplined, professional tactics and used their training, knowledge and capabilities to isolate the attacker and take him into custody, while assisting victims to safely exit.*
- *Members of the Virginia Beach Fire Department (VBFD) and Virginia Beach Emergency Medical Services (VBEMS) responded to bring wounded evacuees to care and others to safety while protecting others who were traumatized. These responders are to be commended for their courage, selflessness and service to others.*

Key Finding #2, Page 18: *The attacker did not display warning signs or prohibited behaviors associated with a pathway to violence that could have provided the City of Virginia Beach or expert threat assessors with an opportunity to intervene ahead of the violence on May 31, 2019 (emphasis added).*

- *The subject's actions, behaviors and communications before the attack did not include many known pre-incident risk factors for targeted workplace violence. While the post-incident review uncovered previously unidentified personal risk factors, these did not rise to an elevated level of risk that would have warranted intervention and do not provide a definitive motive for his attack.*
- *We found no evidence that the subject communicated his violent intentions to others before the attack. This communication of intent is sometimes referred to as "leakage warning behaviors." The attacker did not appear preoccupied with violence nor did he openly exhibit homicidal thoughts or fantasies.*
- *The subject legally acquired several firearms over the past three years. He had recently purchased a gun suppressor and body armor and had reviewed Building 2 floor plans in the days before the shooting. He also used his identification card to access doorways other than those in his area in Building 2. None of these behaviors were known to the City before the attack.*
- *The subject had no known history of mental health care and treatment.*
- *Some of the subject's coworkers described him as reserved, with little emotional affect and socially withdrawn. No one, however, described him, his behaviors or his communications as overtly aggressive or violent. None of the coworkers interviewed thought the subject posed a threat or would commit such a violent act.*

Key Findings #3 through #6 address the Hillard Heintze review of relevant City policies, procedures and practices as they relate to Public Safety, Human Resources, Workplace Violence Prevention, and building and campus physical and technical security. These findings are the basis for 58 recommendations detailed in Sections 2, 3 and 4 of the report and summarized in Section 6. Key Findings #3 through #6 are listed below:

- **Key Finding #3 (Page 19):** *Improving the City of Virginia Beach's workplace violence prevention programs and policies represents a key step towards establishing a new culture of workplace safety across City facilities. The City needs to establish a comprehensive program that holistically enables and advances workplace violence prevention.*
- **Key Finding #4, (Page 21):** *The City of Virginia Beach needs to restructure its highly decentralized Human Resources function, particularly with respect to establishing roles, reporting channels, policies and protocols, data management and training.*
- **Key Finding #5 (Page 23):** *Improvements in the City's critical incident response protocols are warranted in areas such as mass-notification alerting, training and compliance, first responder communications and all-hazards response planning.*
- **Key Finding #6 (Page 26):** *Improvements to various physical and technical security capabilities will help support the City's workplace violence prevention goals and capabilities in the months and years ahead.*

City staff have examined all 58 recommendations, which can be grouped in three functional categories: Human Resources (27 recommendations), Public Safety (20 recommendations) and Facilities Security (11 recommendations). These recommendations are discussed in this response report with respect to the present and future applicability of each to the City organization.

Many of these recommendations – or a functional equivalent – are already in place. Many will be recommended for adoption, some will not. However, it is important to note that none of these recommendations – implemented or not – would have made a difference with respect to the tragic events of May 31. This is made clear in the Hillard Heintze report in Section 1.6 – Retrospective Analysis, excerpted below:

Behavior and Experiences at Work

- *The attacker preferred to maintain his privacy, even with those closest to him (page 58).*
- *While he maintained a consistent outward appearance, he was struggling with a range of issues that included his perception that he was the victim of favoritism and racism on the part of his supervisors. He demonstrated traits associated with paranoia (page 58).*

Motivations

- *In some instances, perpetrators have communicated their intent on carrying out an attack to third parties, behavior that sometimes is referred to as "leakage warning behaviors." In this case, we did not find any evidence of leakage behaviors (page 60).*
- *While he submitted his resignation the day of the shooting, he also engaged in typical work behaviors such as answering emails and going about routine activities associated with his job. He was out in the field with two other coworkers for approximately two hours – neither of whom had any indication that he was about to kill so many of their coworkers (page 61).*
- *While Hillard Heintze identified several pre-incident (mass shooting) risk factors associated with this attacker, taken either collectively or individually, these are not high-risk warnings – and frankly, the lives and behaviors of many American citizens align with these criteria, such as owning weapons, are skilled in their use, have challenges on the job and are divorced (page 61).*

The Subject's Relationships to the Victims

- *Our team heard many rumors . . . and some were presented as fact to the team. However, none of the rumors heard by the team have been determined to be valid or have informed our understanding of what happened (page 62).*

Could This Attack Have Been Prevented?

- *As noted above, the subject was a very private individual. He did not display concerning behavior typical of many other cases we have assessed in which we identified significant early warning signs that could be observed and acted upon. The three risk factors associated with this attacker – weapons skills and/or access, recent job problems and personal stressors – in their reported context of his professional work environment would not normally rise to a perceived level of concern for violence toward others. It appears this was the case, as no one reported any significant pre-incident concerns with respect to his behavior (page 63).*
- *Threat awareness is often based on an employee's engagement in prohibited behaviors. Concerning employees typically demonstrate serious, disruptive, bizarre or aggressive behaviors that are escalated to a threat concern. We do not have that in this attack. Even with the knowledge provided by a retrospective look of the subject's risk factors, some which were not accessible to the City, we find no clearly defined link to the violence he perpetrated on May 31, 2019 (page 63).*
- *Given that the three clear risk factors we identified were relatively low on a WAVR-21 risk evaluation, they alone would likely not have triggered a report to or a response from management (page 63).*

- *Given the limited information regarding the risk factors that the City may have known about before the mass shooting, we believe that, on a scale measuring risk potential for targeted workplace violence to others from Low to Moderate to High to Imminent, the subject would have presented as a Low risk potential (page 64).*

Human Resources Recommendations

Nearly half of the recommendations in the Hillard Heintze report address the City's Human Resources Department: its structure, its policies, and how those policies are applied to the workforce. As described below, many of the Hillard Heintze recommendations were already in place in one form or another, and many others will be adopted and implemented. However, it is important to note that with respect to the attacker and the event itself, Hillard Heintze did not indicate that the City's existing policies played a role in the attacker's motivations or actions. While staff is proposing to adopt most of the human resources recommendations in the Hillard Heintze report that are not already in place, it is highly unlikely that any of them would have prevented the event. Excerpts from the Hillard Heintze report to this effect are listed below:

The City's Policies Related to Workplace Violence Prevention, Recruitment, Hiring and Background Investigations

- *Based on the evidence examined, the shooter did not exhibit any readily apparent issues before the City hired him that would have raised concerns and prompted either additional investigation or a decision not to extend him an offer of employment. Page 123.*

Discipline

- *Hillard Heintze's review and assessment have confirmed that there were no significant, formal disciplinary actions involving the perpetrator. Page 127.*

Termination of Employment

- *Our review of the City's policies and the documented employee performance issues did not identify any behaviors that would have resulted in the attacker's termination of employment based upon his workplace performance. Other employees offered varying opinions as to whether the issue of the work the subject authorized without a signed contract and subsequent challenge with obtaining payment would potentially have resulted in the attacker's termination of employment. Most stated it would not. However, work conversations between coworkers and managers, evidenced by the email messages and voicemails left for the subject, indicated that this issue was a concern for him. Page 129.*

Substance Abuse, Drug Screening and Testing

- *We did not identify any information suggesting that the perpetrator had a substance abuse problem or that substance abuse contributed to the attack in any manner. Page 132.*

Workplace Harassment

- *Our assessors did not identify any evidence that the attacker was subject to or engaged in workplace harassment, including any indication that a manager was aware of a harassment allegation. Page 133.*

Employee Assistance

- *The subject in this case had no record of self-engagement, nor was he referred to an EAP. In that his divorce was a personal matter that was not identified as affecting his work performance by his supervisor, any referral by a manager, as well as his attendance, would be voluntary under the existing policy. We did not find any direct evidence that suggests that, had the subject been referred to an EAP, the referral would have disrupted his pathway to violence. Page 134.*

Privacy and Information Sharing

- *We found no evidence that any individuals withheld vital information or that concerns about sharing private information were a factor leading to the shooting. Page 136.*

Criminal and Administrative Charges and Convictions

- *Our review of the subject's background identified no criminal activity that would have prevented him from working with the City. Page 139.*

Workplace Violence Prevention

- *As previously stated, the subject did not exhibit significant risk factors that collectively would have suggested that he was on a pathway to targeted workplace violence. Page 142.*

Survey Conducted of City of Virginia Beach Stakeholders

- *The majority of respondents who identified as belonging to Engineering felt secure in their workplace prior to and after May 31, 2019. Page 163.*
- *During our public session and employee listening sessions, the discussions were often dominated by statements, paraphrased here, as referring to the City of Virginia Beach as a toxic environment, its workers as unhappy and its leadership as incompetent and malicious. Our assessors found, however, that the public statements did not align with the results of a series of annual surveys conducted by the City in which employees consistently reported high levels of satisfaction. Page 164.*

Community Forums and Employee Meetings: Out-of-Scope Issues Raised

- *Few issues brought forward in the forums were directly related to Public Utilities/ Public Works Departments. . . . Additionally, unless noted below, the issues of toxicity and racism voiced at the public meetings rarely were heard during our interviews. Also, while mentioned in the comments of the survey, they did not represent a significant finding in the survey. Page 169.*
- *For the most part, the employees in Building 2 did not raise these issues in interviews or in surveys and did not raise these issues to the level heard at the public meetings. In addition, management practices did not play a role in the shooting. Page 170.*

The Hillard Heintze Independent Review identified 27 recommendations that fall within the purview of the Department of Human Resources. These recommendations can be grouped within five broad categories: (1) threat assessment and detection; (2) centralization of the Department of Human Resources and related functions; (3) centralization of records pertaining to workplace violence; (4) performance, discipline, termination; and (5) employee reporting and training. Each recommendation has been reviewed to identify how its substance and intent could be implemented. In the course of this review, Human Resources identified that 11 of the recommendations already have primary components within our policies and practices. Further, there are 11 recommendations that can readily be implemented with limited additional resources. Of this group of recommendations, some are partially in place through practice, though not contained within our policies. Others will require policy creation or modification to implement, and steps are being identified to move toward implementation.

The most significant recommendation was to centralize the Human Resources Department. As explained below, this recommendation is not only significant in terms of its cost and resource requirements, but it is also key to many other recommendations.

Threat Assessment and Detection: (Hillard-Heintze recommendations 4.20, 4.23, 4.26, 4.34, 4.38)

In the area of threat assessment and detection, the recommendations included periodic security background checks, establishment of a Threat Assessment Team, centralizing workplace violence prevention in Human Resources, and training for managers and supervisors to understand and detect early warning behaviors.

Human Resources will move forward to implement a Threat Assessment Team (TAT) modeled after the City's Criminal Charge and Conviction panel. Centralizing workplace violence prevention is closely linked to centralizing human resources discussed below and is embedded within that proposal. Other recommendations, such as conducting background investigations prior to employment, have been in place for many years.

However, periodic reinvestigations of employees every three to five years without cause is not feasible under current Commonwealth of Virginia law.

Increased training for managers, supervisors, and employees is a theme throughout the Hillard Heintze human resources recommendations. An additional \$200,000 per year for employee training will be included in the City Manager's Proposed FY2021 budget. This is separate from the additional sums being considered for public safety training and emergency exercises.

Centralization of Human Resources: (Hillard Heintze recommendations 4.13, 4.21, 4.31, 4.32, 4.36)

Like all departments in the City, Human Resources operates in a fiscally constrained environment. Over many years, tight budgets did not allow the department to grow even though the City workforce and human resource mandates and issues were increasing. This led to the decentralization of some services. Larger departments would hire HR liaisons or designate employees within the department to handle several human resource-related functions, including certain disciplinary issues and workplace violence investigations. In many cases, these HR liaisons also had other duties and responsibilities.

The HR liaisons are typically the first point of contact in the departments regarding performance management and discipline, and they would contact the Department of Human Resources for guidance as needed. If the issue was significant or beyond the capacity of the department, Human Resources would take over the investigation and management of the issue. Although this structure allows Human Resources to function with a smaller employee footprint, it does have limitations and drawbacks as described by Hillard Heintze.

Hillard Heintze has recommended that the Department of Human Resources be restructured and expanded "*to achieve a centralized approach to HR functions.*" This would provide a single chain of command, and improve uniformity and consistency with respect to discipline, EEOC complaints, and workplace violence investigations. It would also allow Human Resources to have more authority in the investigation of suspected violations of the City's policies for workplace violence, discipline, and other employment decisions.

This is one of the most significant recommendations in the Hillard Heintze report. The Department of Human Resources had been considering this before the May 31 event based upon success with embedding a Human Resources employee within the VBPD. The HR analyst reports to the Department of Human Resources but is located within and dedicated to VBPD HR issues. In this way, the HR analyst gains expertise in the processes, workflows, and HR issues typically experienced by the VBPD, while also ensuring consistency with Human Resources laws, policies, and procedures. Importantly, it provides an independent review and level of impartiality with respect to difficult or contested disciplinary actions and investigations.

Human Resources has proposed restructuring the department and the existing HR liaisons such that all HR functions would be centralized. The concept would include embedding one or more HR analysts within the larger departments and assigning HR analysts to portfolios made up of smaller departments. This restructuring, which will be reviewed with the City Council during budget deliberations, will require 10 existing and 15 new FTE's. The ongoing cost will be about \$1.5 million per year.

Centralization of Records Relating to Workplace Violence: (Hillard-Heintze recommendations 4.22, 4.29, 4.35)

A logical expansion of the full centralization of human resources functions is a centralization of records pertaining to workplace violence incidents. The Department of Human Resources has been researching case management systems that will allow moving from the current record-keeping system to a more comprehensive web-based platform which includes hotline capabilities to enhance reporting, tracking and data analysis. This enhanced case management system is key and would be a great benefit to the City, particularly in conjunction with full HR centralization.

The enhanced workplace violence prevention program, a new case management system, and full centralization of human resource functions will require increased training for managers and employees for effective implementation and understanding. This training will incorporate new aspects, such as the use of the TAT, and reinforcement of policy requirements that already exist, such as employee reporting of protection orders, substance abuse and workplace harassment. It should be noted that the City has had a *Code of Ethics* and an Ethics Committee for many years. The committee consists of representatives from the City Manager's Office, the Department of Human Resources and the City Auditor's Office. Human Resources had previously identified the need for civility training throughout our workforce and is currently researching available resources and outlining plans to produce a code of conduct, which may impact the *Code of Ethics*. The Ethics Committee is fully supportive of these efforts.

Performance, Discipline, Termination (Hillard-Heintze recommendations 4.12, 4.16, 4.17, 4.18, 4.19, 4.24)

Hillard Heintze recommended protocols concerning actions/meetings with an employee regarding significant discipline, including using a Threat Assessment Team and not bringing employees back on site after delivering pre-disciplinary notices if termination is being considered.

Meeting with an employee prior to imposing formal discipline is required by law. The City has a policy of progressive discipline (reprimand, suspension, termination), and employees facing significant discipline would generally be aware of where they are on that spectrum. Although rare, emotional outbursts and/or violence are possible employee reactions when confronted with termination or other severe discipline. Law enforcement support has been available to departments if they have reason to anticipate problems with an employee. The Threat Assessment Team (TAT) discussed above could be used in these cases to help decide whether Law enforcement support was appropriate. Human Resources is now

considering options such as videoconferencing for the pre-disciplinary meetings, as well as administrative leave pending termination. Human Resources is revising policies to document these options.

As indicated above, a number of Hillard Heintze recommendations are already in place, including documented expectations for employee conduct, improvement-centered disciplinary processes, training for supervisors on the City's discipline policy, and rules ensuring that Employee Assistance Program (EAP) referrals are confidential and will not jeopardize an employee's career or job status. As described below, it is acknowledged that in the current reality, the City may have to become more proactive with respect to mandatory training and periodic retraining in these important standards, processes and available services.

As indicated above, an additional \$200,000 per year for employee training will be included in the City Manager's Proposed FY2021 budget.

Employee Reporting and Training: (Hillard Heintze Recommendations 4.25, 4.27, 4.28, 4.30, 4.37)

Training is a theme common throughout the Hillard Heintze recommendations. Hillard Heintze recommended that the City clarify, emphasize and promote awareness with respect to privacy expectations, substance abuse, domestic violence, workplace harassment, and the sources of support resources offered by the City. It also recommended that City policies be revised to incorporate non-punitive language in City policies to project caring and openness to the reporting of workplace violence concerns.

Hillard Heintze also recommended more training to ensure that employees are aware of the policies, understand violence prevention basics and warning signs, understand the responsibility to report violence in the workplace issues and understand what will happen once they do report.

The City does have an active training program; however, only some of the programs are mandatory and very few require periodic retraining. Most classes are taken at the discretion of the employee and/or supervisor. The City's workforce today is much different than the workforce of just a decade ago. Instead of a long-tenured, low-turnover workforce with a lot of institutional knowledge about City policies, the organization today is experiencing waves of younger workers who tend to change jobs frequently. It is acknowledged that with higher turnover and more younger less tenured employees, the City has to become more proactive with respect to expanding mandatory training and periodic retraining in these important standards, processes, and available services.

As indicated above, an additional \$200,000 per year for employee training will be included in the City Manager's Proposed FY2021 budget.

Public Safety Recommendations

Hillard-Heintze included 20 recommendations related to public safety, which could be categorized into five broad areas: (1) Policy, Procedures, Training; (2) Communications - ECCS; (3) Incident Command/Unified Command/EOC; (4) Victim ID and Interaction with Families, and (5) Using Technology to Receive and Disseminate Information. All 20 of Hillard-Heintze's recommendations are discussed in detail at the end of this report. The section below summarizes the proposed response in these four areas.

Policy, Procedures, Training: (Hillard Heintze recommendations 2.1, 3.8)

Hillard Heintze recommended that the City refine policies and procedures to provide greater detail with respect to the roles and responsibilities of responders to an active assailant incident, with a focus upon specifying the roles and responsibilities of supervisors and commanders on the scene.

It was also recommended that training be provided for different active assailant incidents, and that the training identify assignments and responsibilities for each responder. The training should include communications, command, initial response and apprehension, evacuation and facility management, victim management, family reunification and post-incident investigations and management. The training should include after-action improvements and updating of plans to support improved response protocols.

Public safety leaders agree. In fact, this is done within the City organization and among the public safety departments. Each public safety department has standard operating procedures, general orders, etc., that address responsibilities during a response. Of note, VBPD, VBFD, VBEMS, ECCS and OEM jointly implemented Unified Response Guidelines: Patient Care at Criminal Mass Casualty Incidents in 2015. This guidance, upon which they have trained and responded over the years, addresses how they respond to an active threat together and how they develop unified command. It is standard practice to review plans and policies after incidents, events or exercises in order to incorporate new lessons learned. Teams are already integrating lessons from May 31 into operational policies and procedures.

Training and exercises are important to the city. Specific line-item funding for citywide development of exercises was added to the OEM budget in 2018. OEM has a standing Training and Exercise Work Group that reviews after-action items and develops long-term training and exercise plans. This group is reviewing the recommendations and lessons learned from May 31 to develop a plan moving forward.

Virginia Beach responders have participated in active assailant training on a regular basis since 2011. This activity has focused primarily on the initial response and crisis management. While there has been some training related to reunification, in-depth

exercises related to post-incident management activities have been limited. The expanded scope will be addressed in future exercise activities.

An additional \$200,000 per year for Public Safety training and emergency exercises will be included in the City Manager's Proposed FY2021 budget.

Communications – ECCS: (Hillard Heintze recommendations 2.2, 2.3, 2.4, 2.7)

Hillard Heintze recommended that ECCS protocols be revised and/or developed to include written checklists for communications personnel for an active assailant incident, including providing information about an active assailant's identification and description when advising first responders. The report also recommended that ECCS train and pre-designate communications personnel to assume specific roles in critical incidents, including pre-designated shifts rather than mass response. Not necessarily specific to ECCS, it was recommended that the City provide additional training with respect to establishing separate tactical and operational radio channels during critical incidents, along with training for radio discipline during critical incidents.

ECCS acknowledged that it does not have an active shooter checklist for dispatchers and is working to identify best practices and developing one. ECCS is also reviewing all of its policies, as it does on a regular basis or after a large event or incident occurs, and will adjust as needed. Additionally, ECCS proposes that more advanced intradepartmental training with ECCS occur for better coordination.

There is already an established practice for adding tactical channels and dividing work across these channels as appropriate. The public safety departments do need to exercise this more with ECCS. Radio discipline training already occurs within the public safety departments respective training programs.

As indicated above, an additional \$200,000 per year for Public Safety training and emergency exercises will be included in the City Manager's Proposed FY2021 budget.

Incident Command/Unified Command/EOC: (Hillard Heintze recommendations 3.1, 3.3, 3.4, 3.12)

Hillard Heintze recommended that public safety agencies provide written protocols to clarify the establishment of command for critical incidents, including pre-designating functions for command members for the Incident Command Post (ICP), Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and other command functions involved with emergency incidents.

Instead of VBPD personnel continuing to establish separate incident command posts during critical incidents, it was recommended to provide training that underscores the role of police commanders establishing a unified command with other public safety entities during active assailant and/or other critical incidents. It was also recommended that the

EOC plan be tested and supported with full staff tasked to be on site once an EOC is established.

VBPD already does this and continues to work to improve in this area. There are protocols in place for setting up a Command Post and Emergency Operations Center and it exercises this on a regular basis with special events and annual incidents or drills. The VBPD did participate in the Unified Command structure during the May 31 incident and has participated in Unified Command in all of its special events. When VBPD conducts tabletop and training drills, it is part of the Virginia Beach Public Safety Unified Command structure and it participates in a coordinated and effective manner.

The EOC is set-up at least twice a year for large special events and OEM conducts at least one full-scale exercise annually. Training is conducted throughout the year to include the Incident Command classes, EOC orientation, WebEOC training, and department specific training. Additionally, for the last 5 years, OEM has opened the EOC to respond to several weather-related incidents. OEM is also in the process of finalizing the EOC Standard Operating Procedure for all staff that are responsible for reporting to the EOC before, during and after an event. The City provided line-item funding to OEM in 2018 to support city-wide training and exercises.

As indicated above, an additional \$200,000 per year for Public Safety training and emergency exercises will be included in the City Manager's Proposed FY2021 budget..

Victim ID and Interaction with Families (Hillard Heintze Recommendations 3.2, 3.5, 3.6, 3.9)

Hillard Heintze indicated that the City needs a written policy for quickly identifying victims in mass-casualty situations. This should include protocols for how VBPD is to obtain this data as quickly as possible when multiple law enforcement agencies are involved.

It was also recommended that the City improve written policies to ensure next-of-kin death notification processes are handled timely and professionally during mass-casualty incidents. This should include Family Reunification Center protocols that include muster and set-up support, sign-in logs, and discrete spaces for VBPD.

The death notification process is guided by Virginia State Code and the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner (OCME). OEM will be expanding its documentation and training located in the Family Assistance Center and Family Reunification Plan and working with VBPD and OCME to identify the most efficient manner for mass casualty notifications. The Police Department is also developing written procedures to provisionally address victim identification and next of kin notification in coordination with the Office of the Medical Examiner.

OEM implemented the Family Reunification and Family Assistance Center Plan during the May 31 incident. It had been exercised multiple times prior to the incident and had multiple stakeholders involved in the process. Post-incident, OEM identified areas to improve the plan and has already begun addressing them. OEM will be setting up training and exercises once the plan update is complete.

As indicated above, an additional \$200,000 per year for Public Safety training and emergency exercises will be included in the City Manager's Proposed FY2021 budget.

Using Technology to Receive and Disseminate Information (Hillard Heintze recommendations 2.5, 2.6, 4.10, 4.11)

Hillard Heintze recommended that the City enhance public awareness of and ECCS's ability to receive E-911 text messages. They recommended that ECCS assume responsibility for outbound notifications, revise emergency event notification procedures, and develop and use an all-hazards approach to emergency mass notification messaging including pre-programmed automated notifications when appropriate.

Hillard Heintze also recommended increasing employee and citizen enrollment in emergency alert platforms, including entry of all City devices and updating of employee contact information during the annual performance evaluation.

ECCS implemented a public outreach campaign when text to 911 was released and is currently looking at doing another public outreach push. The ECCS in coordination with Human Resources is developing policies for employees to keep their information up-to-date and to provide a more streamlined and efficient understanding of the notification system. ECCS already manages the notification system and has protocols in place for launching notifications, however it will review the protocols and develop procedures that address active threat/active assailant situations.

Additionally, ECCS is working to implement the Integrated Public Alert and Warning System (IPAWS) system that allows the City to launch messages without an "opt-in" requirement. The IPAWS system is no cost to the City but the emergency mass notification system has some add-on features that may be beneficial to the City as ECCS implements the new notification system.

Facilities Security Recommendations

Hillard-Heintze included 11 recommendations related to facility security issues that could be categorized into four broad areas: (1) creating a Facilities Security Division; (2) first responder access; (3) locks, keys and lock upgrades; and (4) design of new and renovated buildings. While all 11 of Hillard-Heintze's recommendations are discussed individually and in detail at the end of this report, this section summarizes the City's response in these four areas.

Creating a Facilities Security Division: (Hillard-Heintze recommendation 4.1, 4.3, 4.5)

The City has established a security assessment workgroup to review and develop best practices related to physical security. This workgroup includes experts from Homeland Security. Included in the City Manager's Proposed FY2021 Operating Budget will be \$1 million and four positions to create a Facilities Security Division within the Office of Emergency Management. Included in the \$1 million is \$600,000 funding for consulting services to support the review and prioritization of security issues in the City's 387 owned or leased facilities, 310 of which are occupied. The proposed Facilities Security Division will be responsible for the identification and prioritization of City assets to be protected and development and implementation of plans to mitigate and reduce the risk of threats. This division also will be charged with reviewing recommendations 4.3 – 24-hour Monitoring, and 4.5 – Security Technology Systems as part of the overall development of the City's security system based on facility risk.

First Responder Access: (Hillard-Heintze Recommendations 2.8 and 4.6)

These recommendations focus on ensuring the Police Department has the ability to access secured areas of all City facilities during a critical incident (key and card lock access, Knox Boxes, Go-Bags), and breaching tools for forcing entry into critical areas. In the near-term, pending the development of City-wide lock standards and strategies, Public Works (PW) is working with VBPD to ensure that all VBPD personnel have Lenel access to all doors controlled by the Lenel access system.

Given the sheer magnitude and scope of City facilities (300 occupied buildings with tens of thousands of locks) the notion that officers would have ready access to such a wide number and range of mechanical keys, key cards, or cypher lock combinations used in City facilities is not realistic. Keeping in mind that mass shootings can occur anywhere, it is also not feasible for VBPD to have access to the wide variety of security systems found in privately owned buildings throughout the city.

Recognizing this reality, the VBPD is moving forward with the purchase and distribution of an expanded number of breaching kits for its police officers. The newer tools available

today are smaller, lighter, and more portable. The VBPD believes they will be easier to deploy and more effective than the limited number of breaching kits currently available. The plan is to continue to expand the deployment of these tools in future years.

Hillard Heintze also recommended Knox Boxes for each City Building and access by all first responders. Currently, State Code only allows Fire Department personnel to have access to Knox Boxes, so at the present time, VBPD and VBFD will coordinate for access to the Knox Boxes. The long-term strategy and implementation of Knox Boxes and/or Go-Bags, including digital and printed floor plans, ACS card keys and codes would be executed by the newly established Facilities Security Division, which would also be responsible for establishing and implementing long-term strategy for City-wide facility lock and access standards.

Funding totaling \$150,000 per year will be included in the City Manager's Proposed FY2021 Operating Budget for materials and technology needs for public safety personnel to access facilities.

Locks, Keys and Lock Upgrades: (Hillard-Heintze recommendations 4.7, 4.8, 4.9)

Hillard Heintze recommended protocols to control keys in distribution, requesting key access, and conducting annual key inventories. It was suggested that the City develop a key tracking system to identify who has keys and ensure return upon transfer or termination of employment. Electronic locks were recommended wherever possible and that they should "fail secure," so that during a power failure they are not required to automatically open upon fire alarm activation.

One of the Facilities Security Division's first tasks will be to improve building access management via the controls associated with key usage. This includes the distribution of keys, conducting annual inventories and updates, developing a tracking system of who has keys, and developing policies that mandate and track the return of keys upon employees transferring within or leaving the City. As part of the utilization of keys, the Division would develop enhanced security controls including a master key system and marking keys with unique identifying electronic controls where possible.

Two projects will be included in the City Manager's FY2021 Proposed Budget to assist the Division with key and lock usage. The first project was included in the FY2020 Capital Improvement Program prior to the May 31, 2019 tragedy. This project (CIP 3-166 Facilities Access Systems) included \$125,000 per year to provide electronic locks and other components for a centralized access management system. The City Manager's Proposed FY2021 CIP will include an additional \$175,000 per year for a total of \$300,000 annually over the next six years to enhance building access management.

The second project, 3-183 City Security Enhancements, is a new CIP project. It provides \$2.2 million in FY2021, \$3.0 million in FY2022 and \$500,000 in each year from FY2023 to FY2026. Funding from this project would be used for structural and other security related alterations to existing buildings that will be needed as part of building security and access management.

Design of New and Renovated Buildings: (Hillard-Heintze recommendations 3.7, 4.2, 4.4)

Public Works and Moseley Architects of Richmond are working with OEM, VBPD and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security to ensure that the City is taking the appropriate steps to integrate necessary security features into the design-build bridging documents for the renovation of the Operations Building (Building 2), the current but soon-to-be former City Hall (Building 1) and the Public Safety Building (Building 11).

Security features include increased lighting and improved visibility throughout each facility. This includes low partitions and passageways free of visual obstructions so employees and first responders can see and respond to hazards or threats. All interior areas will include multiple, unobstructed points of egress. Well-defined separations of public and City employee spaces are being created through proper layout and the use of integrated Access Control Systems (ACS) at designated doorways. Ballistic materials, including glass and sheetrock, will be used at strategic locations in each facility to allow for shelter-in-place/safe rooms and to provide enhanced levels of security at selected public-employee interfaces.

Public Works and Moseley Architects of Richmond are also reviewing all Hillard Heintze's recommendations and will take into account best management practices as the design-build bridging documents continue to be developed. The best management practices that will likely be specified in documents include the use of video cameras and Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). Subject matter experts from the OEM, VBPD, Information Technology and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security will meet to review and approve the security best management practices to be included.

The new City Hall (currently under construction) already includes enhanced building security, as design occurred prior to the May 31 event.

Other recommendations related in this category focus on managing and securing existing facilities. Recommendations related to 24-hour monitoring for an integrated security technology platform is an extremely resource intensive process that may be more appropriate for specific facilities, such as the Virginia Beach Correctional Center, which currently has 24-hour monitoring capability and the ability to deactivate doorways and control access to different parts of the facility.

Summary

Many of the recommendations made by Hillard Heintze already exist within the City's policies and procedures and some of the recommendations can be implemented with limited resources. Several of the recommendations will require significant resources to implement. As a part of the City Manager's FY 2020-21 Proposed Budget, a total of \$5.5 million in additional resources is being included to implement recommendations within the following three areas:

Human Resources – Increase staffing by 15 FTEs to Centralize Human Resource Operations, establish a Threat Assessment Team, provide additional resources for the implementation of a Case Management System, and funding for additional Human Resource related training throughout the city. In total, an additional \$1.7 million will be considered within the budget to implement these recommendations.

Public Safety – Provide additional resources to increase public safety training and incident response exercises. Additional resources will be included to purchase and expand the number of “breach kits” available to public safety personnel for easier access to city facilities. In total, an additional \$350,000 will be included within the budget to implement these recommendations.

Facility Security – Increase staffing by four FTEs and provide additional resources for the creation of a Facilities Security Division to prioritize and address facility security issues moving forward. To compliment this new office, a new Capital Improvement Program project will be established for the purpose of making structural alterations to existing facilities in need of security improvements. Additional resources will also be provided within the CIP to enhance and accelerate installation of electronic locks and other components of a centralized facility access management system. These CIP projects will be funded through increased pay-as-you-go financing from the General Fund. In total, an additional \$3.5 million will be included within the FY 2020-21 Operating Budget and CIP to enhance facility security. Years two through six of the CIP will also receive additional funding for the implementation of these recommendations.

The City of Virginia Beach is resolute in its commitment to providing an environment in which safety and security are top priorities and that policies, procedures and training reflect this commitment.

Human Resources Detailed Response to Individual Recommendations

4.12	<p>Recommendation: Security Support with Employee Meetings</p> <p>Establish policies and protocols for when departments believe there is a concern regarding any actions or meetings with an employee. Minimally, such requests should occur for any meeting regarding significant discipline. Ensure that a risk tool is used to facilitate the evaluation of need for security support. Once the Threat Assessment Team (TAT) is operational, consider addressing such concerns and requests through the TAT.</p> <p>Response:</p> <p>Human Resources has consistently supported departments' need to contact law enforcement or utilize existing security staff when there are concerns with any actions or meetings with employees. Policy revisions are in process to document this support, offer options to determine when these measures should be implemented, and identify the role of the TAT in this process.</p> <p>Cost: Minimal (staff hours)</p> <p>Timeframe: Short Term (Summer 2020)</p>
4.13	<p>Recommendation: HR Department Organization</p> <p>Restructure the City HR Department to achieve a centralized approach to HR functions. Consider expanding the staff of full-time HR professionals to support a holistic approach to employee issues. Tasking the professional HR staff with specific City departments and support will allow for ongoing engagement between the units and the City HR Department on key employee issues and ensure a balanced and professional approach to employee support services. HR representatives embedded in the departments should work closely with management but report directly to the Employee Relations Manager. Ensure HR professionals do not report to departmental managers but rather collaborate with them in order to curb internal gossip as well as facilitate information sharing from the departments to the City HR Department.</p> <p>Response:</p> <p>Human Resources has developed a new staffing model that will include embedding human resources professionals within departments. This new model will require 10 existing and 15 new FTEs. It will promote a more collaborative working relationship between Human Resources and the workforce.</p> <p>Cost: Approximately \$1.5 million (includes FTEs, supplies & equipment)</p> <p>Timeframe: Begin implementation July 2020. Complete implementation by July 2021.</p>

<p>4.14</p>	<p>Recommendation: Hiring Standards</p> <p>Establish consistent standards for hiring and train all hiring managers and persons with responsibility for hiring on these standards.</p> <p>Response:</p> <p>The City's Recruitment, Applications, and Employment Policy provides standards and requirements related to the hiring process. Managers are offered training, regarding hiring, as part of Supervisor Boot Camp. In the past, training participation has not been mandatory; therefore, attendance has not been rigorously enforced. Human Resources recommends that Supervisor Boot Camp trainings should become mandatory to ensure consistent understanding and application of City human resource policies.</p> <p>Cost: This would be funded by the additional \$200,000 per year for employee training being considered in the FY2021 budget.</p> <p>Timeframe: Already in place. Need training accountability support from MLT to make mandatory.</p>
<p>4.15</p>	<p>Recommendation: Championship of Workplace Violence Prevention</p> <p>Ensure the City government leaders champion and support the violence prevention program. Having "buy-in" from the top creates the legitimacy and urgency critical to implementing a set of tasks that will be new to many, sometimes difficult to carry out and not always completely successful. At the same time, it will be crucial to saving lives. Strong support from leadership will also help establish the program as an integral and long-term priority for the organization, rather than simply a passing initiative.</p> <p>Response:</p> <p>City leadership supports violence prevention and does not consider it a passing initiative. All complaints are taken seriously. The enhancements to the violence prevention program will include updating the current policy, implementing training, providing educational resources, and developing a Threat Assessment Team, which will increase the visibility of the City's commitment to nonviolence in the workplace.</p> <p>Cost: Minimal</p> <p>Timeframe: Already in place</p>

<p>4.16</p>	<p>Recommendation: Code of Conduct or Employee Handbook Establish a Code of Conduct or Employee Handbook that identifies for all personnel the organization's behavioral expectations in the workplace. This Code should incorporate the baseline standards for employee performance, as modified and updated through policies that address specific behaviors. Compiling all such policies into a single, digital handbook allows for consistent review and updating of standards and easy access for managers and employees. Annual training should review not only the Code of Conduct but also identify newly adopted and revised standards.</p> <p>Response: Our Mission, Values & Ethics provide a baseline for our expectations of City employees. Policies are reviewed and updated as needed to address the changing needs of ongoing workforce management. These resources are available on Beachnet and have recently been consolidated to be more visible.</p> <p>Cost: Minimal (staff hours)</p> <p>Timeframe: Already in Place. Possible additions to Code of Ethics.</p>
<p>4.17</p>	<p>Recommendation: Termination-Related Notices When a decision has been made to terminate an individual's employment contract with the City, communicate notice requirements to the employee via email or in person at a neutral location sufficiently distanced from the employee's original workplace and colleagues. Discontinue the practice of bringing employees back on site after delivering pre-disciplinary notice in cases where termination is being considered.</p> <p>Response: Certain provisions within the City's current Discipline Policy, such as pre-disciplinary meetings, are required by due process laws. Human Resources is currently revising the City's Discipline Policy to include provisions to place employees on leave following notification of a potential termination. These revisions will include provisions to either move the pre-termination meeting, if needed, or to permit employees to attend the meeting by phone or Skype.</p> <p>Cost: Minimal (staff hours)</p> <p>Timeframe: Short Term (Summer 2020)</p>

<p>4.18</p>	<p>Recommendation: Negative Performance Evaluations</p> <p>Restructure how the City HR Department addresses negative performance by an employee. Shift to an improvement-centered approach that includes the provision of resources such as promoting the Employee Assistance Program to help employees in stressful situations. Doing so will help redirect employee performance to conform to established standards, mitigate potential issues or lesser grievances and possibly prevent workplace violence.</p> <p>Response:</p> <p>Human Resources does not agree with the implication that the City does not utilize an improvement centered approach to performance management. This approach includes promotion of our Employee Assistance Program. The City's current performance management training is conducted by HR professionals to provide guidance and speaks to coaching, training, counseling and performance improvement plans. Additionally, Human Resources consults daily with department HR Liaisons, supervisors and managers to foster positive performance management techniques.</p> <p>Cost: \$0.</p> <p>Timeframe: Already in Place</p>
<p>4.19</p>	<p>Recommendation: Supervisor Training on Discipline</p> <p>Include HR in every case involving disciplining an employee. Train supervisors on the City's discipline policy and their role in the process. Have HR own and direct employee performance improvement programs, but ensure that supervisors are trained on how to engage with employees exhibiting concerning behaviors, are provided strategies and support in approaching an employee who may be facing significant challenges inside and outside the workplace, and are made aware of the resources they can make available to employees who seem to be facing employment challenges.</p> <p>Response:</p> <p>Human Resources offers regular training opportunities including Performance Management, Policy Review, and Supervisor Boot Camp, where the discipline process and a supervisor's role in the process are clarified. EAP referrals are also part of these trainings. In the past, training participation has not been mandatory; therefore, attendance has not been rigorously enforced. Human Resources recommends that performance management, EEO and policy trainings become mandatory to ensure consistent understanding and application of City human resource policies. Human Resources has developed a new HR model to address HR collaborating with managers. Please refer to 4.13.</p> <p>Cost: Funded by the additional \$200,000 per year for employee training being considered in the FY2021 budget.</p> <p>Timeframe: FY2021 and continuing</p>

<p>4.20</p>	<p>Recommendation: Background Investigations</p> <p>Enhance applicable policies and protocols to address validation of references, licenses, certifications and requirements for independent HR review. Consider expansion of security background checks prior to employment for select employees and recurring checks every three to five years for employees and contractors. This would help mitigate risk, reduce liability and promote workplace safety. City personnel should verify with vendors that contractors have undergone background screenings. While this may seem like a significant undertaking, background screening is becoming increasingly efficient as new technologies and databases are developed.</p> <p>Response:</p> <p>State law prohibits the City from expanding security background checks beyond the hiring process. Virginia Code Sections 19.2-389 A(7), 19.2-389(C), § 15.2-1503.1, and City Code Sec. 2-78 provide guidance on when localities may conduct criminal background checks. The City currently conducts fingerprint checks on all new hires in compliance with these codes.</p> <p>Cost: \$0</p> <p>Timeframe: Already in place.</p>
<p>4.21</p>	<p>Recommendation: Employee Investigations Protocols</p> <p>Develop an employee investigations manual with consistent standards for all city units. In support of this protocol:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Train city supervisors on their roles and responsibilities regarding employee investigations, including nondisclosure and confidentiality. ▪ Remove the discipline decision from the party conducting the investigation, with, ideally, the discipline decision resting with the City HR Department in close coordination with the department manager. ▪ Require independent investigators - with, from, or under the direction of the City HR Department to conduct investigations into allegations of employee misconduct. ▪ Identify early HR controls and guidance to lessen the potential conflicts of interest and bias. ▪ Consider establishing a centralized investigations unit or specifically trained personnel under the control of City HR for handling sensitive investigations to ensure strong controls over confidentiality and to ensure unbiased and independent misconduct investigations. <p>Response:</p> <p>The City's discipline policy speaks to fact-finding procedures. Working with the City Attorney's Office, Human Resources already manages investigations for EEO matters and complies with department requests for HR to lead investigations, such as workplace violence, when appropriate, and during instances of a potential</p>

	<p>conflict of interest. Whenever a non-EEO investigation is referred to the department, they are required to provide a report with findings to Human Resources. Currently, discipline more significant than a 40-hour suspension requires the approval of the Human Resources Director. The City's Discipline Policy is under revision to require Human Resources involvement during all levels of progressive discipline. In addition, the new HR model discussed in section 4.13 will allow Human Resources to better educate supervisors regarding disciplinary actions and investigations and to assume a larger role in the investigative and discipline process.</p> <p>Cost: Minimal (staff hours)</p> <p>Timeframe: Already in place (in part), in process (in part).</p>
4.22	<p>Recommendation: Centralized Personnel Record Database Establish a centralized database with access controls determined by and under the authority of the City HR Department. The level of information available to users should be based on established criteria. This data should reside in the general employee personnel records management systems.</p> <p>Response: Currently, the City already uses a central repository, Oracle's (InSITE) system, to centralize personnel records with access controls determined by and under the authority of the Human Resources Department. The level of information available to users is based on established criteria. Implementation of the new Human Capital Management System (HCM), in approximately 3 years, will further enhance the controls and functionality and provide more sophisticated abilities.</p> <p>Cost: \$0</p> <p>Timeframe: Already in place. Enhanced Human Capital Management System pending in three years.</p>
4.23	<p>Recommendation: Threat Assessment Team Establish an interdisciplinary Threat Assessment Team to handle behavioral threat assessment and management. The TAT can be convened and can operate like the current Charge and Conviction Panel, though with much more flexibility. TAT membership should include HR, Legal Counsel and an appropriate manager. Ensure a working relationship with the EAP managers. Emphasize a holistic approach to employee support while ensuring continued focus on workplace violence prevention and coordination through the TAT.</p> <p>Response: Human Resources is partnering with internal stakeholders to enhance the City's violence prevention program to include the implementation of a TAT modeled</p>

	<p>after the City's Criminal Charges and Conviction's panel. Statutory restrictions related to TATs will dictate the composition of team, roles and responsibilities.</p> <p>Cost: Minimal (staff hours)</p> <p>Timeframe: Midterm. (Fall of 2020 to end of calendar year)</p>
<p>4.24</p>	<p>Recommendation: Employee Assistance Program</p> <p>Develop a widespread campaign throughout the organization emphasizing that EAP referrals can be compassionate, are always confidential and will not jeopardize an employee's career or job status. Add an EAP representative to the TAT on an ad-hoc basis to help provide insight and share relevant case information. However, ensure that only TAT members are present for case strategy discussions. EAP representatives might also be able to provide generalized summary information to the team to give insight into a particular issue raised by employees or in a specific area of the business.</p> <p>Response:</p> <p>The City has conducted EAP campaigns in the past and EAP resources are noted on our benefits website. The Consolidated Benefits Office has also marketed the EAP in their newsletter. EAP is discussed in policy and in training – EEO, Performance Management and Supervisor Boot Camp. Managers and employees are reminded of the availability of these resources on a case-by-case basis. Due to confidentiality laws, EAP will not be able to share relevant case information.</p> <p>Cost: \$0</p> <p>Timeframe: Already in place.</p>
<p>4.25</p>	<p>Recommendation: Privacy Rules</p> <p>Have the City HR Department and management work with the Legal Department to clarify privacy expectations, as well as to identify how the various privacy rules apply to the City's work environment.</p> <p>Response:</p> <p>Human Resources is developing a policy to address professional conduct that will supplement the City's Values and Ethics. This will include privacy expectations.</p> <p>Cost: Minimal (staff hours)</p> <p>Timeframe: Short Term</p>

<p>4.26</p>	<p>Recommendation: HR Responsibility for Workplace Violence Prevention</p> <p>Assign HR the responsibility for the workplace violence prevention program and designate the Employee Relations Manager as the TAT Leader. Establish, document and follow a formal process when investigating and assessing potential threats. Give HR the responsibility for investigating reported or suspected violations of the policy and concerns related to violence.</p> <p>Response:</p> <p>Human Resources is partnering with internal stakeholders to enhance the City's violence prevention program to include the implementation of a TAT. Additional staff resources, as outlined in section 4.13, will be needed to move the responsibility of investigations from the departments to Human Resources.</p> <p>Cost: Would be included in HR Restructuring Costs</p> <p>Timeframe: Begin midterm implementation. End of the calendar year.</p>
<p>4.27</p>	<p>Recommendation: Employee Reporting Protocols</p> <p>Modify the City's HR policies to incorporate non-punitive language that projects a more caring tone to encourage reporting of concerns. Include information about the City's multi-disciplinary TAT - once established - and what employees can expect once they report a concern.</p> <p>Response:</p> <p>Human Resources is partnering with internal stakeholders to enhance the City's violence prevention program. The program will include education and marketing to encourage employees to report concerns and information about process expectations. As noted in 4.23.</p> <p>Cost: Minimal (staff hours)</p> <p>Timeframe: Begin midterm implementation. End of the calendar year.</p>

<p>4.28</p>	<p>Recommendation: Protection Orders</p> <p>Revise applicable policies to require the reporting of protection orders that include the workplace to ensure appropriate security protocols are implemented. Privacy of the employee should be respected in these situations, such as reporting to the City HR Department rather than the department's HR Liaison. Any such report should be accompanied by a subsequent safety plan development for the premise and the employee.</p> <p>Response:</p> <p>The City's Violence Prevention Policy addresses protective orders. Upon notification, departments consult with Human Resources and the City Attorney's Office to make appropriate arrangements. The enhancements to the violence prevention program will further clarify expectations related to protective orders.</p> <p>Cost: \$0</p> <p>Timeframe: Already in place</p>
<p>4.29</p>	<p>Recommendation: Centralization of Reports to Document Violence Risk Investigations</p> <p>Establish a single "fusion" process to examine all potential sources of information pertaining to employee misconduct and inappropriate workplace behaviors. Develop protocols for recognizing and reporting potential concerns to a centralized point of contact for evaluation and tracking. Consider leveraging hotlines such as the City's Waste Fraud and Abuse Hotline to permit anonymous reporting of concerns - supported by clear standards as to what the function, role and responsibility for such reporting are and what outcome reporting requirements should attach to the report.</p> <p>Response:</p> <p>Establishing a single "fusion" process to examine all potential sources of information for the purpose of profiling employee behavior is not realistic or appropriate. Human Resources is working to implement a web-based case management system that will allow a centralized, standardized system for tracking incidents of potential workplace violence and complaint investigations. This system will enable historical review of records and data analysis to improve citywide decision-making. Implementation of this resource includes a 24-hour toll-free number for staff to report concerns.</p> <p>Costs: Already programed. Additional costs would be included in Human Resources Restructuring Costs.</p> <p>Timeframe: Begin midterm implementation. End of the calendar year.</p>

<p>4.30</p>	<p>Recommendation: Employee Awareness Implement awareness campaigns on key issues affecting employees - for example, substance abuse, domestic violence and workplace harassment – that provides ongoing focus on the support measures offered by the City and how to seek help. Include information about the City's multi-disciplinary TAT - once established - and what employees can expect once they report a concern.</p> <p>Response: Information regarding EAP, workplace harassment, violence prevention and other relevant topics are discussed at various citywide trainings. Policies are available on the City's internal website, and information is housed on the Consolidated Benefits Office's website. We will review these measures to determine if additional marketing is needed. Human Resources is partnering with internal stakeholders to enhance the City's violence prevention program. The program will include marketing to encourage employees to report concerns and provide information about process expectations. Please refer to 4.34 and 4.28.</p> <p>Costs: This would be funded by the additional \$200,000 per year for employee training being considered in the FY2021 budget.</p> <p>Timeframe: Begin midterm implementation. End of the calendar year.</p>
<p>4.31</p>	<p>Recommendation: Expansion of City HR Department's Authority Give HR the responsibility for investigating reported or suspected violations of the policy and concerns related to violence.</p> <p>Response: Additional staff resources will be required for Human Resources to assume responsibility for investigating reported or suspected violations of the policy and concerns related to violence. Currently, Human Resources reviews department-conducted investigations of reported or suspected violations of the policy and concerns related to violence to provide guidance on appropriate corrective actions.</p> <p>Costs: As noted in 4.13. Additional costs would be included within Human Resources Restructuring Costs</p> <p>Timeframe: Begin midterm implementation July 2020. Full implementation by July 2021.</p>

<p>4.32</p>	<p>Recommendation: Single Chain of Command for HR Ensure HR professionals collaborate with departmental managers to provide opportunity for privacy on sensitive issues, reduce internal gossip as well as facilitate information-sharing from the departments to the City HR Department.</p> <p>Response: Single chain of command is dependent on appropriate allocation of resources and support from City leadership. Human Resources is developing a policy to address professional conduct that will supplement the City's Values and Ethics. This will include privacy and accountability expectations at all levels of the organization.</p> <p>Costs: Pending decision on Human Resources Restructuring. Some costs are minimal (staff hours)</p> <p>Timeframe: Begin midterm implementation July 2020. Full implementation by July 2021.</p>
<p>4.33</p>	<p>Recommendation: Information Sharing Plan Establish a team comprised of legal counsel, HR and law enforcement personnel to develop an information sharing plan with public safety exceptions that is easy to understand and implement - and one that will save lives.</p> <p>Response: Human Resources, City Attorney's Office, and VBPD share pertinent information for managing personnel matters that may require legal or public safety resources.</p> <p>Cost: \$0</p> <p>Timeframe: Already in place</p>
<p>4.34</p>	<p>Recommendation: EAP Threat Reporting Guidelines Establish enhanced information sharing with EAP through applicable policies and procedures to facilitate formal reports to the City when any of the following circumstances are indicated:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Threat of harm to or abuse of a child or elderly person, as part of mandated reporting. ▪ Threat of imminent risk to self or to another person. <p>Response: The City's EAP providers are subject to mandatory reporting and confidentiality requirements. Providers update Human Resources/Occupational Safety and Health Services when concerns arise with program compliance.</p> <p>Cost: \$0</p> <p>Timeframe: Already in place</p>

<p>4.35</p>	<p>Recommendation: Centralization of Records Related to Workplace Violence Prevention</p> <p>Develop a centralized, standardized system for tracking incidents of potential workplace violence. Establish a system for keeping these records centralized regardless of employee location.</p> <p>Response:</p> <p>Human Resources is working to implement a web-based case management system that will allow a centralized, standardized system for tracking incidents of potential workplace violence and complaint investigations.</p> <p>Costs: As noted in 4.13. Additional costs would be included within Human Resources Restructuring Costs</p> <p>Timeframe: Begin midterm implementation. End of the calendar year.</p>
<p>4.36</p>	<p>Recommendation: Notification to HR of Discipline Resulting in Time Off</p> <p>Require that HR have notice and review of discipline of any employee that results in time off. The HR review should include sufficiency of the finding that resulted in discipline, notice leading to the discipline and proportional discipline given the penalty. We recommend elsewhere in this report that the City consider an Ombudsman; however, minimally, HR should have a citywide record of all discipline that results in time off.</p> <p>Response:</p> <p>Additional staff will be required for Human Resources to assume responsibility for reviewing increased levels of discipline beyond current requirements. The Oracle (InSITE) system is the centralized personnel record database where all formal disciplinary documents are stored. Implementation of the web-based case management system includes a 24-hour toll-free number for staff to report concerns anonymously.</p> <p>Costs: As noted in 4.13. Additional costs would be included within Human Resources Restructuring Costs</p> <p>Timeframe: Begin midterm implementation. End of the calendar year.</p>

<p>4.37</p>	<p>Recommendation: Workplace Violence Prevention Training Ensure through training that employees are made aware of the policy; have a basic understanding of violence prevention basics and warning signs; understand their responsibility to report; and have a general understanding of what will happen once they report. The multidisciplinary TAT should be trained in higher-level behavioral threat assessment concepts as well as team dynamics, management strategies, best practices and guidelines.</p> <p>Response: Human Resources is partnering with internal stakeholders to enhance the City's violence prevention program to include the implementation of a Threat Assessment Team and threat assessment tools.</p> <p>Costs: An additional \$200,000 per year for employee training is being considered in the City Manager's FY2021 budget. Additional costs would be included within Human Resources Restructuring Costs</p> <p>Timeframe: Long term end of 2021</p>
<p>4.38</p>	<p>Recommendation: Training for Managers and Supervisors Implement training for managers and supervisors on how to understand early warning behaviors and work with the City HR Department to manage difficult employees and situations. Supervisory training should include supportive measures for early indicators of performance decline, such as referrals to EAP, before such behaviors become larger problems.</p> <p>Response: Human Resources encourages managers to refer employees to EAP as a supportive measure in managing employee performance. This is regularly discussed in citywide trainings and management consultations with HR. This includes clarification of professional conduct expectations and enhanced training with a stronger focus on employee support and accountability. Research is being conducted on the availability and success of threat assessment tools.</p> <p>Costs: An additional \$200,000 per year for employee training is being considered in the City Manager's FY2021 budget. Additional costs would be included within Human Resources Restructuring Costs</p> <p>Timeframe: Long term end of 2021</p>

Public Safety Detailed Response to Individual Recommendations

2.1

Recommendation: Policies and Procedures

Refine applicable policies and procedures that outline, in much greater detail, the specific roles and responsibilities of those responding to an active assailant incident, with a focus on clarifying the roles and responsibilities of supervisors and command officers on scene. This would include leading, guiding and directing the actions of responding personnel; distinguishing the roles of SWAT personnel versus responding patrol units; establishing inner and outer perimeters; establishing family reunification centers; and notifying victims' families.

Response:

We have traditionally taken a role of All-Hazards Planning for emergencies, with the goal to have an overall plan that includes departmental Standard Operating Procedures. We have been evaluating the need for a specific Active Assailant Plan.

VBPD has operated with specific policies pertaining to active shooter events for several years. Over time, we have adapted response protocols to match or exceed best practices and have provided regular training during in-service and basic academy evolutions. Entry team formations, improved equipment, and integration with our public safety partners to provide more timely medical assistance in critical incidents are examples that demonstrate our commitment to continuous learning.

Cost: An additional \$200,000 per year for Public Safety training and emergency exercises is being considered in the City Manager's FY2021 budget.

Timeframe: Short Term

<p>2.2</p>	<p>Recommendation: Checklists for Communications Personnel</p> <p>Refine and update protocols to include written checklist for communications personnel to use when handling an active assailant incident. Identify key things dispatchers could do to assist on-scene personnel in coordinating tasks and responsibilities and include protocols to more common incidents to help ensure that appropriate resources are sent immediately to the scene.</p> <p>Response:</p> <p>ECCS currently utilizes checklists for notifications and Emergency Medical Dispatch (EMD) to process 9-1-1 calls received for medical assistance. ECCS is currently reviewing existing policies, procedures and training to ensure best practices are utilized when dispatching units to active assailant and other incidents.</p> <p>Cost: Minimal (staff hours)</p> <p>Timeframe: Short Term</p>
<p>2.3</p>	<p>Recommendation: Unique Tactical and Operational Radio Channels</p> <p>Provide additional training for ECCS personnel and first responders on the importance of establishing separate tactical and operational radio communications channels during critical incidents, along with the need to maintain radio discipline during critical incidents.</p> <p>Establish priority protocols that automatically authorize the establishment of a second, third and fourth channel as needed.</p> <p>Task supervisors on scene with the responsibility to ensure radio discipline.</p> <p>Continually emphasize in roll call training and with after-action reports the value of radio discipline in large events. Too much radio traffic may prevent timely rescue and engagement.</p> <p>Response:</p> <p>We have established practices for adding tactical channels and dividing work across these channels as appropriate. There are protocols in place, and we continue to review radio communications after significant events and utilize them to improve response for the next event. ECCS would like to exercise and train with the public safety departments more frequently to continue to improve procedures.</p> <p>Cost: \$0</p> <p>Timeframe: Already in place, working to expand training opportunities</p>

<p>2.4</p>	<p>Recommendation: Pre-Designation of Personnel Roles</p> <p>Ensure communications personnel are trained and pre-designated to assume specific roles in the event of a critical incident. Ensure the pool of personnel are identified in advance and pre-designated to report in shifts rather than mass response.</p> <p>Consider key incident functions and develop a protocol for staff assignments to specific roles and functions.</p> <p>Train to designated roles including the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and Joint Information Center (JIC) support.</p> <p>Allow for expansion and contraction, including secondary support for personnel who are absent.</p> <p>Response:</p> <p>OEM already does this but is in process of expanding plans and protocols. The City has an EOC roster of those responsible to report to the EOC and they are trained in their respective positions. OEM is completing an EOC SOP to further assist departmental representatives with job aides. The City trains annually in the Emergency Operations Center in preparation for hurricane season. Additionally, OEM has provided EOC orientation and ICS training for all representatives required to be in the EOC for activations. We are working to make training available in an online format for a greater ease of access.</p> <p>Cost: Minimal</p> <p>Timeframe: Already in place, adding additional documentation</p>
<p>2.5</p>	<p>Recommendation: ECCS Ability to Handle Incoming Texts</p> <p>Enhance community outreach regarding ECCS's ability to receive E-9-1-1 text messages at its communications center, since only two such text messages were sent to them during this active shooter incident. ECCS should increase its efforts to publicize this capability to the public. Sending silent text messages when under duress is one of the best ways for those involved in any active assailant situation to communicate.</p> <p>Response:</p> <p>ECCS began accepting text messages in 2015 and was one of the first PSAPs in Virginia and the U.S. to do so. Significant outreach was done initially and has continued throughout the years. In coordination with Human Resources, ECCS is developing policies for employees to keep their information up-to-date and to provide a more streamlined and efficient understanding of the notification system. ECCS already manages the notification system and has protocols in place</p>

	<p>for launching notifications, however it does need to review the protocols and develop procedures that address active threat/active assailant situations.</p> <p>ECCS is working to implement the Integrated Public Alert and Warning System (IPAWS) system that allows the City to launch messages without an “opt-in” requirement.</p> <p>Cost: Already programmed or minimal (staff hours)</p> <p>Timeframe: Already in place and working to expand</p>
<p>2.6</p>	<p>Recommendation: Notification Procedures</p> <p>Refine and update notification procedures for ensuring key personnel and citizens, in general, are notified of emergency events. This includes active assailant events. Use pre-programmed automated notifications whenever possible. Have ECCS assume responsibility for notifications and review its current notification processes to clarify exactly who should be notified and how, considering that an effective emergency alert system may consist of any or all of the five following mechanisms for notifying emergency personnel:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Emergency dispatch 2. Text message 3. Email 4. Mobile app push notification 5. Voice call <p>Response:</p> <p>ECCS is working with Human Resources, Communications Office and other public safety departments to refine internal and external communications. One challenge is ensuring City employees keep their information up-to-date in the InSite system so that the notification list is current. Human Resources will work with stakeholders to use the annual evaluation as an opportunity to update information. We will be implementing the Integrated Public Alert and Warning System (IPAWS) in Virginia Beach so that we can notify employees regardless of their opt-in for the city notification system.</p> <p>Cost: TBD. There are add-ons to the system that may enhance the notification process for city employees</p> <p>Timeframe: Short Term</p>

<p>2.7</p>	<p>Recommendation: Broadcasting the Source of Information</p> <p>Refine training and applicable written policies to ensure ECCS communications personnel provide as much information as possible about the source of an active assailant's identification and description when advising the first responders in an active assailant situation. Knowing the source of a suspect's description is invaluable for the first responders making initial assessments and key decisions at the scene.</p> <p>Response:</p> <p>ECCS currently does this on all calls and did this on May 31 during the shooting incident. It is part of the SOPs for dispatchers and has been exercised a number of times over the last several years. ECCS is reviewing policy, procedures and training to identify any areas that could be utilized when dispatching an incident.</p> <p>Cost: \$0</p> <p>Timeframe: Already in place</p>
<p>3.1</p>	<p>Recommendation: Roles and Responsibilities</p> <p>Pre-designate roles and responsibilities for command members for the Incident Command Post (ICP), Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and other command functions that respond to critical incidents. Ensure that response personnel are tasked with pre-planned assignments and secondary duties for escalation contingencies. Train to these roles and anticipated contingencies for various scenarios - including the absence of an identified member, alterations in plan and potential gaps - such as pre-planned locations not being available.</p> <p>Response:</p> <p>Public safety leaders does not agree that pre-designated roles is the best option. They utilize an all-hazards approach and cross-train so people can fill multiple roles and have clear guidance for the expectations of the positions. Incident Command does not wait for a "leader" to arrive. The first person on scene is in charge and responsible for all functions until they are relieved, or command is passed. This is the same for the EOC; the first person is responsible for all the functions until other personnel arrive. Public safety leaders do agree the Virginia Beach Incident Management Team (VBIMT) needs more training, increased staffing, and this model should be incorporated across the public safety departments. This team should be used for intelligence sharing and planning while not mitigating emergencies.</p> <p>Cost: Additional \$200,000 per year for Public Safety training and exercises is included in City Manager's FY2021 budget.</p> <p>Timeframe: Short Term</p>

<p>3.2</p>	<p>Recommendation: Victim Identification</p> <p>Formalize specific written policies and procedures to guide VBPD personnel to identify victims in mass-casualty situations as soon as possible, with an emphasis on creating protocols for how VBPD personnel are to secure such information as quickly as possible when multiple law enforcement agencies are involved in the follow- up crime scene processing and investigation activities.</p> <p>Response:</p> <p>VBPD is developing written procedures to provisionally address victim identification and next of kin notification in coordination with the Office of the Medical Examiner.</p> <p>Cost: Minimal (staff hours)</p> <p>Timeframe: Short Term</p>
<p>3.3</p>	<p>Recommendation: Chain of Command</p> <p>Refine applicable written protocols and procedures to clarify the establishment of command for critical incidents. Chain of command, guidance and authority is critical to a successful police resolution. Issues that address radio communication and discipline, the effective allocation of resources, and operational issues such as crossfire, "blue on blue" and other concerns relevant to the risks faced within the jurisdiction should be addressed.</p> <p>Response:</p> <p>This guidance is and has been in place. Chain of command, along with associated roles and responsibilities, is discussed in detail within General Orders 1.03 (Organization & Administration) and 1.04 (Command & Direction), as well as within our Emergency Operations Plan.</p> <p>Cost: \$0</p> <p>Timeframe: Already in place</p>
<p>3.4</p>	<p>Recommendation: Unified Command</p> <p>Refine written policies and provide additional training that emphasize the critical role of police commanders in establishing a unified command with other public safety entities during active assailant or other critical incidents, rather than having VBPD personnel continue to establish separate incident command posts during such incidents.</p> <p>Response:</p> <p>All public safety departments follow the Unified Response Guidelines: Patient Care at Criminal Mass Casualty Incidents. This document mandates the use of Unified Command and the utmost coordination between all responding agencies. On May 31, 2019, senior officers from Police, Fire and EMS assembled as a group</p>

	<p>early in the incident. While a Police Department Incident Commander was not always standing next to the EMS and Fire Unified Commanders, their Commander was always accessible in proximity. Leaders from Fire, EMS and Police conferred regularly and shared a common operating picture. Many tactical decisions, such as the when and where to land the air ambulance, were made with input from all three agencies. The City of Virginia Beach will continue to stress the use of Unified Command in future exercises, planned events and emergent incidents.</p> <p>Cost: \$0</p> <p>Timeframe: Already in place and utilized</p>
<p>3.5</p>	<p>Recommendation: Next-of-Kin Notification and Supervisor Training</p> <p>Improve written policies to ensure next-of-kin death notification processes are handled in the timeliest and most professional manner possible during mass-casualty incidents. Include signed MOUs relating to response requirements to mitigate barriers that could exacerbate the anxiety and grief that victims' families are already experiencing. Provide specific and ongoing training for supervisors and command personnel regarding the revised policies for securing the identities of victims in mass-casualty incidents and for making death notifications in the most professional and compassionate way possible.</p> <p>Response:</p> <p>The death notification process is guided by Virginia State Code and the Office of the Chief Medical Examiner (OCME). OEM will be expanding its documentation and training located in the Family Assistance Center and Family Reunification Plan and working with VBPD and OCME to identify the most efficient manner for mass casualty notifications. MOUs are not necessary for this recommendation as there is state code in place.</p> <p>Cost: Minimal (staff hours)</p> <p>Timeframe: Short Term</p>
<p>3.6</p>	<p>Recommendation: Case Management</p> <p>Establish a case management system to track the EOC and Family Reunification Center process efficiently and effectively. Ensure that protocols identify the role for a scribe and that records are not only maintained but also reviewed and finalized with the closure of both the EOC and FRC. Consider making these parts of the CAD record system to ensure access through the incident.</p>

	<p>Response: A case management solution was presented to OEM earlier this year that would address the issues identified in the recommendation. The solution provided a tool that supports case management during an event and provides the flexibility to adapt to any event and utilize with cloud technology so that it did not have to be inside the City firewall. This is currently in development.</p> <p>Cost: TBD</p> <p>Timeframe: TBD</p>
<p>3.8</p>	<p>Recommendation: Active Assailant Training Provide training specific to the continuum of possible events in an active assailant incident. Ensure that this training designates specific assignments and responsibilities for each responder. The training scenarios must expand to include roles, tasks and protocols beyond those associated with initial response training. Ensure role focused training for key components of an active assailant scenario – including communications, command, initial response and apprehension, evacuation and facility management, victim management, family reunification and post-incident investigations and management. Train to respond to specific scenarios, with after-action improvements and updating of plans to support these additional response protocols.</p> <p>Response: This has already occurred and continues as part of overall training throughout the public safety agencies. A significant amount of Active Assailant Training had been conducted prior to May 31, 2019. This included a full-scale exercise just two months before the attack. Police, Fire and EMS personnel had also recently conducted joint in-service training focused on Rescue Task Force deployment. The after-action reports from May 31, 2019 and similar events around the country will be used to update response protocols and training evolutions. Future scenarios will expand the role focused training related to key components of the active assailant scenario. VBPD is reviewing family reunification and post-incident investigation training requirements. In October 2019, ECCS operations employees received training based on DCJS guidelines regarding active assailant incidents. Beginning in 2018, new ECCS 9-1-1 employees received active assailant training based on DCJS guidelines in the new hire training academy.</p> <p>Cost: Additional \$200,000/year for Public Safety training and emergency exercises included in City Manager’s FY2021 budget.</p> <p>Timeframe: Ongoing</p>

<p>3.9</p>	<p>Recommendation: Family Reunification Center Procedures Establish Family Reunification Center protocols that include muster and set-up support, sign-in logs and establishing discrete spaces for victims' families.</p> <p>Response: This plan was in place prior to the event and is being updated based on lessons learned. Also, training is being developed for all stakeholders. We are receiving guidance and assistance from the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) as we update and implement the plan.</p> <p>Cost: \$0</p> <p>Timeframe: Already in place</p>
<p>3.10</p>	<p>Recommendation: Support Services for First Responders Provide first responders and investigators with appropriate support services to address concerns over post-traumatic stress, fatigue and burnout. Ensure appropriate staffing and support to cover long-term work, including mutual aid as appropriate. In the early stages of an incident, specifically task a command member to plan for the long-term staffing needs, separate from the immediate response, and plan for staff coverage and relief to avoid burnout.</p> <p>Response: EAP and Occupational Health Services (OHS) are not necessarily the answer for all circumstances. Peer support and VB Strong Center seem to be helping, but we have long-term needs for which significant investment is needed in getting appropriate professionals involved to identify and help our personnel. This task is conducted in the EOC, where the Logistics Section is key to supporting the overall response to an event. The EOC did provide support for the incident, however many agencies called upon their own colleagues to come and assist. We are working with the Logistics Section/Resource Management to provide more structure for tracking and identifying assets that come and provide mutual aid.</p> <p>The Police Department has placed a priority on workforce wellness and resiliency. The Wellness Committee is aware of these factors and has taken extensive action before, during, and after this incident. ECCS is establishing a wellness program for employees. This program, once completed, will provide services and programs specifically tailored for 9-1-1 and 311 employees. ECCS also utilized mutual aid in the days following the 5/31 incident to provide ECCS employees the opportunity to attend debriefing sessions. ECCS will develop a process to ensure a long-term staffing plan is developed for a critical incident.</p> <p>Cost: TBD</p> <p>Timeframe: TBD</p>

<p>3.11</p>	<p>Recommendation: Post-Incident Investigations Support</p> <p>Ensure MOUs between first responders incorporate more than initial response needs, such as post-incident support for evidence collection, victim property return, interviews and data review. Task victim outreach and communications support to staff not directly engaged in the investigation.</p> <p>Response:</p> <p>Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) between City departments is not supported or necessary. Unified Command should determine deployment and resources necessary. The City currently has MOUs in place with some outside agencies, most for very narrow provisions and circumstances. While MOUs are important and utilized in some areas, relationships and partnerships are more important in establishing an understanding of the resources available to support our city in a variety of areas.</p> <p>VBPD is currently developing written procedures to establish a balance between a thorough crime scene investigation and the timely handling of evidence, property, and interviews. The Department will review the availability and coordination of post-event victim-witness services involved in outreach efforts.</p> <p>Cost: Minimal (staff hours)</p> <p>Timeframe: Short Term</p>
<p>3.12</p>	<p>Recommendation: Emergency Operations Center Plan</p> <p>Ensure that the EOC plan is tested and supported with full staff tasked to be on site once an EOC is established.</p> <p>Response:</p> <p>The City trains annually in the EOC in preparation for hurricane season. Plans moving forward include exercising the EOC for non-weather-related events and implementation of the EOC Standard Operating Procedure in 2020. Additionally, we have provided EOC orientation and ICS training for all representatives required to be in the EOC for activations. We are working to make training available in an online format for a greater ease of access.</p> <p>Cost: Minimal</p> <p>Timeframe: Already in place</p>

<p>4.10</p>	<p>Recommendation: Emergency Alert Platform Enrollment</p> <p>Develop strategies to improve employee and citizen enrollment in emergency alert platforms. Consider mandatory entry of all City issued communication devices. Conduct a recurring review of employee contact information. To ensure current enrollment, update notification information during the annual performance evaluation.</p> <p>Response:</p> <p>See responses to recommendation #2.5 and #2.6. As ECCS is working through implementing its new system, it is developing policies for employees in order to provide a more streamlined and efficient notification system. ECCS will also be working to implement the IPAWS system that the city can launch messages without the “opt-in” requirement.</p> <p>Cost: Already programmed</p> <p>Timeframe: Short Term</p>
<p>4.11</p>	<p>Recommendation: Emergency Mass Notification Messaging</p> <p>Apply an all-hazards approach to emergency mass notification messaging. Develop protocol and policy to ensure consistent messaging and outreach during emergencies, including appropriate pre-recorded messaging. Ensure contingencies are in place to send the initial message and updates as soon as possible.</p> <p>Response:</p> <p>We have utilized an all-hazards approach to notification procedures for several years and a standard operating procedure is in place for developing the message and launching the message. We have implemented a new notification system and are in the process of updating the SOPs.</p> <p>Cost: Already programmed</p> <p>Timeframe: In Process</p>

Facilities Security Detailed Response to Individual Recommendations

2.8 Recommendation: Facilitating First Responder Access

Ensure VBPD personnel can access secured areas of all City facilities immediately during a critical incident, and secure and have readily available adequate breaching tools to assist SWAT and other first responders in forcing entry into critical areas.

Response:

All sworn VBPD Officers have been granted Lenel card reader access to City facilities. However, standards and policies will be developed on the safety and protection of the Lenel access cards. Considerations for the security implications of a lost or stolen badge or a PD assailant should be assessed before granting open access. People sheltering in place will likely obstruct doors so the Lenel system is not the only challenge. Alternative entry points will be explored. The Fire Department spends a great deal of time on forcible entry equipment and training. The Fire Department has recently trained with VBPD SWAT on forcible entry equipment and techniques and could assist VBPD breaching teams in the warm zone when necessary.

Currently, sworn VBPD Offices have been granted Lenel card access to City Facilities doors controlled by Lenel access system. The Public Work/Operation and Public Utilities/Operations Facility at Dam Neck Road utilize a separate automated control system for entry. VBPD has been given access rights to that facility.

Cost: \$0

Timeframe: Implemented

Facility doors locked with key locks, or with combination locks installed by the occupying department are another matter. Identifying all such doors, providing VBPD with current keys and combinations, updating those keys and combinations for VBPD and creating an operational logistics system so that whoever is responding has access to those keys and combinations presents several significant logistics challenges. There is no current inventory of doors that are locked by key or combination, nor is there an inventory of key holders. Preparing and implementing a long-term lock strategy would be one of the primary tasks of the Facilities Security Division.

However, the scope of a Key Control Program would likely be more daunting than it may sound:

- Survey of all 387 City-owned or leased buildings to ascertain which doors are locked with keys or combination locks. It's likely that the total number of locks would be in the tens of thousands.
- Develop a long-term strategy including specifications and standards for locks and risk-based criteria for when and where the standards would apply.
- Develop a long-term (many years to decades) funding and implementation plan to apply the lock strategy to new and rehabilitated buildings.
- Set up a key control program to issue, track and recover keys and master keys. The program would require ongoing management and oversight to keep it up to date.

Cost: Unknown

Timeframe: Unknown, but would have to be implemented over a long period of time (many years to decades)

During a dynamic event such as unfolded in Building 2, timeliness of the public safety response and access to the area of concern is critical. As noted previously, the likelihood of officers having ready access to the wide range of mechanical keys, key cards, or cypher lock combinations currently in use in city buildings is not realistic. Recognizing this, the VBPD has already moved forward with the purchase and distribution of an expanded number of Patrol Breaching Kits. The latest technology is smaller, lighter, and more portable than current equipment. VBPD believes they will be more effective than the small number of breaching kits currently available. Department-wide training is ongoing so that each sworn member will have a basic understanding on how and when to use the tools. The plan is to continue to expand the deployment of these tools in future years to the point where many police vehicles have them onboard.

Cost: Approximately 40 Active Patrol Breaching Kits were purchased at a cost of \$424 per kit. Total cost \$16,960. Funding totaling \$150,000 per year will be considered in the City Manager's proposed FY2021 Operating Budget for materials and technology needs for public safety personnel to access facilities.

Timeframe: First round of purchase implemented. Future purchases will be within the budget year.

	<p>Another optional solution to the issue of providing responding officers more universal access to city buildings is to expand access to Knox Box devices to include law enforcement officers. Currently by state code, only Fire Department personnel have access to these devices (Virginia Statewide Fire Prevention Code Section 506 Key Boxes). To gain access VBPD and VBFD will coordinate to access the Knox Boxes. The long-term strategy and implementation of Knox Boxes and/or Go-Bags, including digital and printed floor plans, ACS card keys and codes would be executed by the newly established Facilities Security Division, which would also be responsible for establishing and implementing long-term strategy for City-wide facility lock and access standards.</p> <p>Cost: Minimal (staff hours)</p> <p>Timeframe: Within budget year FY2021.</p>
<p>3.7</p>	<p>Recommendation: Physical Security Improvements</p> <p>When designing office space, ensure planners consider best practices, as outlined throughout this report, with respect to issues such as access to exit doors, secured entry and places to hide in the event of an active assailant.</p> <p>Response:</p> <p>Fire and Life Safety codes must be considered while making these modifications. The newly formed Risk Assessment and Security Working group and – if approved – the proposed Facilities Security Division will examine all the recommendations. The City is currently working with the Department of Homeland Security and others to do risk assessments on all the buildings under construction, those set for renovation, and the remainder of the City’s occupied buildings.</p> <p>Cost: Included in the cost of normal design services</p> <p>Timeframe: This activity will be part of any future project’s schedule.</p>
<p>4.1</p>	<p>Recommendation: Physical and Technical Security</p> <p>Assign a specific department with qualified staff the responsibility for physical and technical security for City facilities. Ensure this accountability includes strategy development, policy, procedures, standards, budget development, implementation and compliance.</p> <p>Response:</p> <p>There are very few municipalities in Virginia that have a dedicated Security Office. The City Manager is proposing a four-member Facilities Security Division within OEM. It will be responsible for identifying and prioritizing City assets to be protected, threats to those assets and personnel, the risk of loss associated with each asset, and the appropriate measures to be taken.</p>

	<p>Cost: The proposed FY21 budget contains four FTE's (\$400,000) plus professional support (\$600,000) for \$1,000,000 annually. The proposed FY21 CIP will include a new project (City Security Enhancements) with \$2.2 million in FY21, \$3.0 million in FY22, and \$500,000 each year from FY23 to FY26. Funding From this project will be used for structural alterations to existing buildings as identified by the Facilities Security Division.</p> <p>Timeframe: Yearly as part of the City's Operating and CIP budgets.</p>
<p>4.2</p>	<p>Recommendation: Minimum Standards</p> <p>Minimum Standards: Develop minimum security technology standards for all buildings and departments. This should include ACS controls on exterior doors and interior hallway doors separating public areas from employee work areas as well as intrusion detection system (IDS) requirements. Standards should also address security camera coverage of public spaces, including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Entry/Exit Points - Interior and Exterior ▪ Public Hallways ▪ Elevator Landings ▪ Stairwells ▪ Any location where transactions with the public regularly occur <p>Response:</p> <p>The proposed Facilities Security Division will review and develop best practices related to physical security. The division will be responsible for the identification and prioritization of City assets to be protected, identification of threats and personnel, the risk of loss associated with each asset, the appropriate measures to be taken to mitigate the threat, and reduce the likelihood and reduce the risk.</p> <p>Adequate security requires an integrated approach to threat assessment, desired level of protection, security personnel capabilities, employee training, operable/interactive infrastructure, fixed infrastructure systems and response protocols.</p> <p>Cost: Included in funding plan for Recommendation 4.1</p> <p>Timeframe: Yearly as part of the Operating and CIP budget.</p>

<p>4.3</p>	<p>Recommendation: 24-hour Monitoring</p> <p>Develop a 24-hour monitoring capability for the integrated security technology platform. For maximum impact during incidents like the May 31, 2019 shooting, locate the monitoring point in a central dispatch location or, at minimum, somewhere with direct communications capabilities to first responders. A trained operator may have been able to immediately deactivate doorways the attacker attempted to enter from the public hallway.</p> <p>Response:</p> <p>This is an extremely resource-intensive item that is not feasible for all City facilities. It might be appropriate for specific facilities based upon a risk-analysis. Examples might include City Hall, the Court Complex, some IT facilities, or the Virginia Beach Correctional Center (VBCC), which currently has a 24-hour monitoring capability. The VBCC has an integrated security technology platform, central dispatch within the facility, responders standing by and, trained operators capable of deactivating doorways.</p> <p>Cost: Unknown, but could be extremely high depending on scope</p> <p>Timeframe: None at this time</p>
<p>4.4</p>	<p>Recommendation: Numbered Entryways and Doorways</p> <p>Mark all access control locations and doorways with information that is reflected in the monitoring platform so that first responders can request the release of a specific door while leaving other doors locked to restrict or contain a subject. For example, the 2nd floor of Building 2 had nine ACS door readers. By numbering these doors, such as 2-01 thru 2-09, an officer could have requested an operator release 2-02 or another number as they advanced through the building.</p> <p>Response:</p> <p>This type may be applicable in certain facilities subject to certain threats and risks. The proposed Facilities Security Division will be evaluating numbered entryways and doorways as part of developing minimum standards.</p> <p>Currently Public Works places a visible, numbered label on each door access reader after installation. The reader number is also listed in the door access software. By identifying a reader number, an individual door can be remotely opened or locked from the Lenel software program.</p> <p>Cost: CIP 3-166 Facilities Access Systems currently funds Lenel door access reader installation at \$125,000 per year. The City Manager’s Proposed FY20-21 CIP includes an additional \$175,000 to bring the yearly total to \$300,000.</p> <p>Timeframe: Yearly as part of the CIP schedule.</p>

<p>4.5</p>	<p>Recommendation: Security Technology Systems</p> <p>Integrate security technology systems (ACS, IDS and VMS) for City-operated facilities. Incorporate as-built floor plans in the integration monitoring platform. Develop a graphical user interface (GUI) depicting all security devices on the floor plans Program the GUI's icons to correspond to specific device functions, e.g., allowing the operator to monitor and activate the security features from a single point of access.</p> <p>Response:</p> <p>The Facilities Security Division will review this recommendation as part of Recommendation 4.3: 24-hour Monitoring.</p> <p>Cost: TBD pending a decision to attempt to implement this recommendation.</p> <p>Timeframe: None at this time</p>
<p>4.6</p>	<p>Recommendation: Go-Bags and Knox Boxes</p> <p>Develop Knox Box go-bags for each City building. Ensure all first responders are aware of the go-bags and Knox Box locations and how to access them. At a minimum, these go-bags should include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Digital and printed floor plans ▪ Multiple building all-access ACS cards ▪ Master keys for all interior spaces ▪ Codes for any manual push-button locks <p>Response:</p> <p>Knox boxes are already located on all city facilities designated by the Fire Marshal. Currently, State Code only allows Fire Department personnel to have access to Knox Boxes, so at the present time, VBPD and VBFD will coordinate for access to the Knox Boxes. The long-term strategy and implementation of Knox Boxes and Go-Bags, including digital and printed floor plans, ACS card keys and codes, will take considerable planning by the Facilities Security Division. ACS cards, keys and codes change regularly. Building floor plans will need to be developed for older facilities. Standardization of "go bags" is feasible; however, considerable planning is necessary to ensure the standardization and security of these bags to effectively allow all first responders to know from whom or from where to obtain them.</p> <p>Cost: Initial costs can be covered by proposed Security CIP and annual costs will be added to the operating budget.</p> <p>Timeframe: Annually</p>

<p>4.7</p>	<p>Recommendation: Key Usage Improve controls over the keys in distribution. Establish request protocols that task unit-level supervisors with responsibilities for requesting key access and conducting inventories annually. Develop a tracking system to allow for identification of who has keys and policies that mandate return upon transfer or termination of employment. Enhanced security controls to review include a master key system and marking keys with unique identifiers. Consider electronic controls in place of keys wherever possible.</p> <p>Response: The proposed Facilities Security Division will be charged with developing a long-term strategy and key control system, policies and procedures.</p> <p>Cost: Initial funding for the system will be from the City of Virginia Beach Security CIP. Ongoing support for the system will be added to future operating budgets.</p> <p>Timeframe: Annually</p>
<p>4.8</p>	<p>Recommendation: Lock Upgrade Replace magnetic locks with electric strikes or electric lock sets, wherever possible, that "fail secure," meaning that during a power failure they are not required to automatically open upon fire alarm activation.</p> <p>Response: Fire and Life Safety codes must be followed and applied to balance the need to protect the safety of our employees and citizens, and at the same time maintain security and not complicating egress during an emergency. Lock upgrades will be made as part of the facilities threat assessment evaluation and the long-term lock strategy developed by the proposed Facilities Security Division.</p> <p>Cost: Funding for locks will be part of the proposed \$300,000 annual funding for CIP 3-166 Facilities Access Systems.</p> <p>Timeframe: Annually</p>

4.9 Recommendation: Panic or Emergency Alert Buttons

Incorporate panic or emergency alert buttons in the IDS and ACS. A monitored system provides the best option to evaluate the alarm and initiate the appropriate response in a timely fashion. The City's Lenel Access Control system can incorporate panic and emergency call buttons. The City can improve security by actively monitoring access control system activity at a central monitoring location and by both developing and conducting regular response training for building occupants.

Response:

The use of panic or emergency buttons should be incorporated into a facilities communication plan and should be determined by a facilities use, threat, and risk assessment. It's possible to install panic buttons at workstations, counters and other appropriate locations. Those panic buttons could be linked to the Lenel Access Control System (ACS) to open or lock down doors as appropriate. Any panic system to be installed must be separate and distinct from fire alarms and all employees would need to know how to respond to each. Care in location needs to be considered so control of responding is with the security professionals. The effectiveness of panic or duress buttons are based on location and whether they are linked to 9-1-1 so that security forces could be dispatched to the location when pushed. How many buttons to deploy and where they should be deployed needs to be based upon the threat, likelihood and risk assessment of the facility.

Cost: Funds for security measures will come from the new CIP project 3-183 City Security Enhancements.

Timeframe: Annual

Summary of Costs and Budget Impacts

		FY 2021	FY 2022	FY 2023	FY 2024	FY 2025	FY 2026	FTEs
CIP	3-166 Facility Access Systems	\$300,000	\$300,000	\$300,000	\$300,000	\$300,000	\$300,000	
CIP	3-183 City Security Enhancements	\$2,220,585	\$2,977,837	\$500,000	\$500,000	\$500,000	\$500,000	
Operating Budget	Facilities Security Office	\$1,000,000	\$1,030,000	\$1,060,900	\$1,092,727	\$1,125,509	\$1,159,274	4.00
Operating Budget	Citywide PS Training/Exercises	\$200,000	\$200,000	\$200,000	\$200,000	\$200,000	\$200,000	
Operating Budget	Public Safety Building Access	\$150,000	\$150,000	\$150,000	\$150,000	\$150,000	\$150,000	
Operating Budget	Human Resources Restructuring	\$1,490,147	\$1,534,851	\$1,580,897	\$1,628,324	\$1,677,174	\$1,727,489	15.00
Operating Budget	Additional Employee Training	\$200,000	\$200,000	\$200,000	\$200,000	\$200,000	\$200,000	
Total		\$5,560,732	\$6,392,688	\$3,991,797	\$4,071,051	\$4,152,683	\$4,236,736	19.00